Possible Effects of the Proposed East-West Trade Relations Act Upon U.S. Import, Export,and Credit Controls by Berman, Harold J. & Garson, John R.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 20 
Issue 2 Issue 2 - A Symposium on State Trading Article 3 
3-1967 
Possible Effects of the Proposed East-West Trade Relations Act 
Upon U.S. Import, Export,and Credit Controls 
Harold J. Berman 
John R. Garson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the International Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Harold J. Berman and John R. Garson, Possible Effects of the Proposed East-West Trade Relations Act 
Upon U.S. Import, Export,and Credit Controls, 20 Vanderbilt Law Review 279 (1967) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol20/iss2/3 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more 
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Possible Effects of the Proposed East-West
Trade Relations Act Upon U.S. Import, Export,
and Credit Controls
Harold I. Berman* and lohn R. Garson"*
UNrrED STATES IMPORT CONTROLS
In 1966, and again in the President's State of the Union message
in January 1967, the Administration announced that it would ask
Congress to pass an "East-West Trade Relations Act." The immediate
effect of such legislation would be to permit the President to abolish
existing discriminatory restrictions upon imports from the Soviet Union
or other Communist countries of Eastern Europe (excluding East
Germany), in the context of bilateral commercial agreements de-
signed to "provide a framework helpful to private United States
firms conducting business relations with Communist state trading
agencies."' Such agreements, it is contemplated, would be reached
"by instituting regular goverment-to-government negotiations with
individual Communist countries concerning commercial and other
matters of mutual interest."2 The agreements would have a maximum
duration of three years and would be subject to suspension or termina-
tion at any time upon reasonable notice.3
The Administration's proposed act, if adopted, would permit the
President-insofar as the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are con-
cerned-to overcome the effect of section 231 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, as amended, which requires the application of the
1930 tariff rates to all imports from "any country or area dominated
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
* Research Associate in Law, Harvard Law School.
1. Sec. 2(b). The proposed act, called "The East-West Trade Relations Act of
1966," [hereinafter referred to as Proposed Act] is published in 54 DF_'T STATE BULL.
No. 1405, 838 (May 30, 1966), and in Dep't of State, The Battle Act Report 1966,
19th Rep. to Congress 36.
2. Other purposes of the proposed legislation are "to promote constructive rela-
tions with Communist countries," and "to contribute to international stability," Pro-
posed Act § 2(b); "to use peaceful trade and related contracts with Communist
countries as a means of advancing the long-range interest of the United States in
peace and freedom," Proposed Act § 2(a); "to increase peaceful trade and related
contracts between the United States and Communist countries, and to expand markets
for products of the United States in these countries by creating similar oppor-
tunities for the products of Communist countries to compete in United States markets
on a non-discriminatory basis," Proposed Act § 2(c).
3. Proposed Act § 5(d). The section provides that the commercial agreements.
shall be renewable for additional periods, each not to exceed three years.
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or controlled by Communism," except Yugoslavia and Poland.4 Since
the general level of American tariffs has declined from about 50 per
cent ad valorem in 1930 to about 15 per cent in 1966, the application
of the 1930 duties is a substantial trade barrier. Also, the proposed
act would authorize the President to terminate, with respect to the
Soviet Union, the effect of section 11 of the 1951 Trade Agreements
Extension Act, which directed the President to "take such measures
as may be necessary to prevent the importation of ermine, fox,
kolinsky, marten, mink, muskrat and weasel furs and skins ... which
are the product of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or of
Communist China."5
The new legislation would not, however, result in the automatic
restoration of most-favored-nation treatment; the President would re-
tain the power to maintain or relax restrictions on imports from
Communist countries, depending upon his success in negotiating
commercial agreements with them individually.
The conception that most-favored-nation treatment should be ex-
tended to Communist countries not merely in exchange for a re-
ciprocal grant of most-favored-nation treatment, as is the general
practice in international relations, but in exchange for additional
4. 76 Stat. 882 (1962), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1861 (1965). This restriction
was first introduced by § 5 of the Trade Ageements Extension Act of 1951, which
required the withdrawal of all trade agreements concessions granted under the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 from the Soviet Union and "any nation
or area dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization
controlling the world Communist movement." 65 Stat. 73 (1951). The effect of the
replacement of the quoted words of the 1951 Act by the words of § 231 of the 1962
Act, and the special treatment of Yugoslavia and Poland, are discussed below.
5. 65 Stat. 75 (1951), 19 U.S.C. § 1367 (1965). See § 10(c) ("Relation to Other
Laws") of the proposed legislation. Other United States import restrictions that would
be affected by the proposed act are discussed in Berman, The Legal Framework of Trade
Between Planned and Market Economies: The Soviet-American Example, 24 LAw &
CoNrTF_N. PROB. 482, 506-08 (1959). They include the provision of the 1930 Tariff Act
that imports whose cost of production is lower than that prevailing in the United States
are to be subjected to an increased duty in order to "equalize" the costs of production
in the two countries. 46 Stat. 687 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1965). This provision
does not apply to goods imported from countries with which the United States has
a reciprocal trade agreement. 48 Stat. 944 (1934), 19 U.S.C. § 1352 (1965). When
the United States in 1951 denounced its trade agreements with Communist countries,
they became exposed to the liability that such equalization duties would be applied.
Although this hazard has never materialized, the application of most-favored-nation
treatment to an individual Communist country would remove it entirely. In addition,
several other tariff barriers-namely, anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties designed
to neutralize foreign governmental subsidies, and the prohibition of imports of goods
produced by convicts or forced labor-though not specifically directed against Com-
munist countries, present a special danger to them. Indeed, the prohibition against
imports of goods produced by forced labor was applied in 1951 to Soviet crabmeat,
16 Fed. Reg. 776 (1951), and was only removed by President Kennedy in 1961.
26 Fed. Reg. 2552 (1961). Passage of the proposed East-West Trade Relations
Act would help to create a political climate less favorable to the application of these
restrictions to Communist countries.
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commitments as well, is not a new one.6 It is generally recognized
that the reciprocal reduction of customs duties by a country whose
entire trade is conducted by state agencies does not necessarily assure
foreign exporters of a greater opportunity to sell their goods; customs
duties would not affect decisions to import because they are paid by
one state agency (the importer) to another (the Treasury). There-
fore, when most-favored-nation treatment was first accorded to the
Soviet Union by the United States, under an executive agreement
of August 4, 1937, it was granted in return for Soviet commitments
to purchase at least 40 million dollars worth of American goods.
7
Britain had previously negotiated a somewhat similar Soviet commit-
ment." Today it is better understood, however, that imports are no
sacrifice for centrally planned economies of the Soviet type; they
would prefer only to import, if they could. Moreover, they are happy
to commit themselves to import goods up to a specified value, for
this leaves them free to make their own selection and to retain their
own built-in governmental restrictions.
Wisely, then, the proposed East-West Trade Relations Act does not
speak in terms of negotiation of most-favored-nation treatment in
exchange for commitments to import goods up to a specified value.
Section 4 of the proposed act lists, as "matters of mutual interest"
that may be covered in the commercial agreements, various types
of problems that have created, or may create, obstacles for Americans
seeking to do business with Communist state trading agencies. These
include (but "need not be restricted to"):
(a) satisfactory arrangements for the protection of industrial rights and
processes; (b) satisfactory arrangements for the settlement of commercial
differences and disputes; (c) arrangements for establishment or expansion
of United States trade and tourist promotion offices, for facilities of such
6. Cf. Domke & Hazard, State Trading and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause,
52 Am. J. INTL L. 55 (1958); Berman, Rapport Final, in Aspxcrs JuIRUiQUF~s Du
CONMMCE AvEc LEs PAYS D'EcoNOMm PLANIFI E (International Association of Legal
Science, Paris 1961). It should not be assured, however, that the granting of most-
favored-nation treatment to a Communist country would involve an economic loss to
the United States, for which some specific compensating benefit must be obtained. On
the contrary, equal tariff treatment for imports from Communist countries would
presumably constitute an economic benefit to American importers and to American
consumers of the imported products. Nevertheless, the removal of tariff discrimina-
tions can serve not only as a benefit to American importers and consumers but also as
an inducement to another country to reduce its restrictions upon American exports.
7. Commercial Agreement with U.S.S.R., Aug. 4, 1937, 50 Stat. 1619, E.A.S. No. 105.
This agreement was subsequently extended for one-year periods: Aug. 5, 1938, 53 Stat.
1947, E.A.S. No. 132; Aug. 2, 1939, 53 Stat. 2404, E.A.S. No. 151; Aug. 6, 1940,
54 Stat. 2366, E.A.S. No. 179; Aug. 2, 1941, 55 Stat. 1316, E.A.S. No. 215;
July 31, 1942, 56 Stat. 1575, E.A.S. No. 265.
8. The Soviet Union agreed to make purchases from Britain proportional to its
exports to Britain, with different ratios fixed for different years. 149 L.N.T.S. 446
Treaty Series 446 (1934).
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efforts as the trade promotion activities of United States commercial officers,
participation in trade fairs and exhibits, the sending of trade missions, and
for facilitation of entry and travel of commercial representatives as neces-
sary; (d) most-favored-nation with respect to duties or other restrictions
on the imports of the products of the United States, and other arrange-
ments that may secure market access and assure fair treatment for products
of the United States; or (e) satisfactory arrangements covering other
matters affecting relations between the United States and the country
concerned, such as the settlement of financial and property claims and
the improvement of consular relations.9 [Emphasis added.]
The act thus implicitly accepts the idea that reciprocal most-
favored-nation treatment in trade agreements with Communist coun-
tries should take the form of a series of particularized non-discrimi-
natory, or "fair treatment," provisions relating to specific areas of
trade relations, and in addition, it recognizes the possibility of ob-
taining special commitments of a concrete nature.10
Viewed in these terms, as a framework primarily for the reduction
of import restrictions on both sides, the proposed legislation could
hardly be termed radical. It offers the possibility of extending to
some other Communist countries-chiefly Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-
slovakia, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union-the treatment now ac-
corded to imports from Yugoslavia and Poland. The denial to Com-
munist countries of tariff concessions, that is, of reductions in customs
duties made under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934
and generalized to all countries to which we extend most-favored-
nation treatment, dates from 1951. It was in that year that the
Congress, in section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act, re-
quired for the first time that the President withdraw trade agree-
ment concessions from the Soviet Union and "any nation or area
dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organi-
zation controlling the world Communist movement."" Yugoslavia,
which had broken with the Soviet Union in 1948, was not considered
a Communist nation within this definition. In 1960, President Eisen-
hower determined that Poland was also independent of such domi-
nation or control for purposes of customs treatment.12 (In 1956, a
similar determination had been made with respect to Poland for
9. Very little has been published in the United States concerning the problems
that would arise in negotiating the matters listed. A short discussion of various
kinds of restrictions against trade that exist in the Soviet Union, and of various
ways in which such restrictions may be reduced, may be found in Berman, supra
note 5, at 482-504, 521-28. For an excellent recent study of problems of reaching
accommodations concerning protection of industrial rights and processes, see Clesner,
Proprietary Rights and East-West Trade (pts 1-2), 9 IDEA 75, 183 (1965).
10. See Berman, supra note 5, at 525.
11. Supra note 4.
12. Agreement Relating to Settlement of Claims of Nationals of the United States
Against Poland and Exchange of Notes, July 16, 1960, T.I.A.S. No. 4545.
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purposes of local currency sales of surplus agricultural commod-
ities under Public Law 480). 13 Then in 1962 Congress substituted
for the above-quoted language of section 5 of the Trade Agree-
ments Extension Act of 1951 the words "any country or area domi-
nated or controlled by Communism,"'14 thereby requiring the President,
"as soon as practicable," to add Yugoslavia and Poland to the list of
proscribed countries. In 1963, however, before the President had
found it "practicable" to make the change, Congress, in response to
strenuous Administration efforts, permitted Yugoslavia and Poland to
be exempted from the proscription, provided that the President
"determines that such treatment would be important to the national
interest and would promote the independence of such country or
area from domination or control by international communism, and
reports this determination and the reasons therefor to the Congress;"
15
and on March 26, 1964, the President made and reported such a
determination. If Congress had not in 1962 adopted the words
"dominated or controlled by Communism," it would have been
possible for the Administration to remove discriminatory tariff restric-
tions with respect to Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bul-
garia simply by declaring, as it did in 1960 with respect to Poland,
that one or more of these countries were not "dominated or controlled
by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the
world Communist movement." It would be extremely difficult, of
course, for the President to say that they are not "controlled by Com-
munism," although technically they call themselves socialist and
deny that they have reached the stage of Communism.
Even with the existing restrictions, the President is free to enter
into executive agreements with any of the countries concerned.
Such agreements would be hampered, however, by the congressional
mandate to maintain the 1930 tariff rates. The granting of the
benefit of our current tariff schedules to Poland in 1960 was part
of an executive agreement under which Poland consented to make a
defered-payment lump-sum compensation agreement on account of
Polish nationalization of American-owned property.' 6 In 1964, when
13. See text accompanying notes 16 & 59 infra.
14. Supra note 4.
15. Foreign Assistance Act § 402, 77 Stat. 390 (1963), 19 U.S.C. § 1861(b) (1965).
This provision authorized the President to extend the benefits of trade agreements
concessions to Communist countries which were receiving such benefits on December
16, 1963, subject to the provisos quoted in the text. Yugoslavia and Poland were the
only such Communist countries.
16. Supra note 12. The first agreement between the United States and Communist
Poland, concluded on June 7, 1957, provided for the sale and shipment of $18,900,000
of surplus agricultural commodities, with payment in Polish zlotys, pursuant to Title I
of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 454
(1954), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1691 (1965). The zlotys were to be deposited*
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representatives of the United States and Rumanian governments met
in Washington to discuss trade, they reached agreement on various
matters. However, the Joint Communiqu6 stated that "The Rumanian
delegation emphasized that Rumanian products cannot compete on
an equal basis in the United States market under the tariff treatment
accorded such products" and that "this factor could limit the ex-
pansion of trade between the two countries." The United States
delegation "took note of this concern, and explained the applicable
provisions of United States law." 7 Rumania might well become the
next Communist country to receive most-favored-nation treatment if
the proposed East-West Trade Relations Act becomes law.
UNTrED STATES EXPORT CONTROLS
There are, however, larger political and economic implications
in the proposed act. Politically, its enactment would signify the
acceptance by Congress of the Administration's view that trade in
nonstrategic goods with selected Eastern European countries can
be used as a flexible foreign policy weapon to weaken ties with the
Soviet Union and with each other.18 At various times since 1957,
to the account of the United States, and on the same date of such deposit were to
be converted and transferred to a special dollar denominated account to the credit
of the United States in the National Bank of Poland. Poland agreed to purchase for
dollars the balance of zlotys unexpended in 1962, to the extent of $726,000 annually.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities Agreement With the Polish People's Republic, Juno
7, 1957 [1957] 8 U.S.T. & O.L.A. 799, T.I.A.S. No. 3839 (effective June 7, 1957).
In addition, the United States loaned Poland $30,000,000, administered through
the Export-Import Bank, for the purchase of surplus products and mining machinery.
This line of credit is repayable at 4%% interest in dollars over a 20-year period,
beginning in 1962. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1957, p. 1, col. 5.
On Aug. 14, 1957, the June 7th agreement was supplemented by the additional
financing by the United States of wheat and cotton sales totalling $46,100,000, in
return for zlotys under the same arrangement. Agreement Amending the Surplus
Agricultural Commodities Agreement With the Polish People's Republic, June 7,
1957 [1957] 8 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1289 T.I.A.S. No. 3878 (effective Aug. 14, 1957).
17. 50 Dxs,'T STATE BULL. 924 (1964).
18. In 1965, a Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with East European
Countries and the Soviet Union stated that "the case for expanding peaceful trade
[with Communist countries] comes down to the proposition that we can use trade
to influence the internal evolution and external behavior of Communist countries.
Trade provides us with a policy instrument to encourage the movement toward
greater national independence in Eastern Europe and the trend toward greater
concern for consumer needs in all the European Communist countries..... The
Committee was created by the President on February 16, 1965, "to explore all aspects
of expanding peaceful trade in support of the President's policy of widening con-
structive relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R." Its re-
port was the immediate stimulus to the proposed East-West Trade Relations Act. For
the text of the "Miller Report" (so named for the Chairman of the Committee,
J. Irwin Miller), see Dep't of State, The Battle Act Report 1965, 18th Rep. to Con-
gress 50.
Also in a 1962 amendment to the Export Control Act of 1949 Congress declared
that "it is the policy of the United States to use its economic resources and ad-
C VOL. 20
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the Administration has granted, or has sought to grant, special treat-
ment of one form or another to Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-
slovakia, and Bulgaria.19 In the last few years, it has even accorded
the Soviet Union certain advantages over East Germany and Al-
bania.20 Congress, however, as already indicated, has sought to thwart,
or to impose special conditions upon, concessions made by the
Executive Branch to particular Communist countries. Also, since 1951
Congress has enacted a labyrinth of restraints of one kind or another
on trade with "unfriendly countries," with "any nation or combi-
nation of nations threatening the security of the United States,"
with the "Sino-Soviet bloc," with countries "controlled by the for-
eign government or foreign organization controlling the world Com-
munist movement," and with countries "controlled by Communism."21
Certainly, one of the main purposes of the Administration in pro-
posing the East-West Trade Relations Act is to secure congressional
acceptance of the more flexible policies followed by four successive
Presidents.
In addition to this political purpose the proposed act has further,
perhaps even more critical, significance. It would not only permit
the relaxation of import restrictions on goods from individual Com-
munist countries in return for concessions, but would also authorize
the creation of a framework for the promotion of trade with indi-
vidual Communist countries, to the mutual advantage of both sides.
In this respect it would, for the first time, supplement our existing
system of negative controls by a new system of positive controls.
For although the proposed act does not alter the existing structure
of United States export and credit restrictions, the commercial agree-
ments which it contemplates would provide an opportunity to adapt
vantage in trade with Communist-dominated nations to further the national security
and foreign policy objectives of the United States." 76 Stat. 127 (1962), 50 U.S.C.A.
App. § 2022(3) (Supp. 1966). This amendment was not sponsored by the Adminis-
tration. It can be read to mean that Congress recognizes that trade with Com-
munist nations can have positive value as an instrument of foreign policy.
The 1963 amendment to § 231 of the Trade Expansion Act, supra note 15, can
also be read as a limited acceptance by Congress of the pluralism of the Com-
munist world.
19. Concerning special treatment for Poland, see text accompanying notes 13-16 supra
and notes 48, 59 & 63 infra; for Rumania, see text accompanying note 48 infra; for
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, see text accompanying note 63 infra.
20. See text accompanying note 35 infra.
21. Background Documents on East-West Trade, SENs. Commsvi. ON FOREIGN REL.,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 1965). This report is the most complete summary to
date of United States restrictions on trade with Communist countries. For a very good
analysis of these restrictions, see Metzger, Federal Regulation and Prohibition of Trade
With Iron Curtain Countries, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PnOB. 843, 1000-18 (1964). See
also Berman, supra note 5 at 504-20. For restraints on the granting of commercial




those restrictions in such a way as to expand, and not prevent, trade.
From an economic point of view, perhaps the most important pro-
vision of the proposed act is the statement in section 4 that the
benefits to be obtained from the commercial agreements "need not
be restricted" to the items listed. Given the nature of the foreign-
trade systems of the Communist countries to which the act would
be applicable, and given their economic interest not only in increas-
ing their exports to us but also, and especially, in increasing their
imports from us, one may easily forecast the approach which their
representatives would take in negotiating. In particular, one may
assume that they will want to obtain assurances from the United
States that export licenses will be granted for definite quantities of
particular American products. Moreover, one may assume that the
United States negotiators will also be interested in obtaining Soviet
and East European commitments to import definite quantities of
particular American products-though not necessarily the same quan-
tities or products as those proposed by the other side. Indeed, the
principal economic impetus to the East-West Trade Relations Act
is not the desire to increase Soviet and East European exports to
us, but rather the desire to increase our exports to them. This is
due to a belated realization that our export and credit controls have
forced the Communist countries to purchase goods in Western Europe
and Japan which we have made it difficult or impossible for them
to buy in the United States.2 2 "Free world" exports to Communist
countries amounted to 7.5 billion dollars in 1965; in the same year
United States exports to Communist countries amounted to less than
140 million dollars.
An evaluation of the proposed act thus requires an analysis not
only of existing American restrictions upon imports from Communist
countries, but also of existing American export and credit restrictions,
22. Cf. the Miller Report, supra note 18. A 1962 amendment to the Export Con-
trol Act of 1949 which states that "it is the policy of the United States . . . to
formulate a unified commercial and trading policy to be observed by the non-Com-
munist-dominated nations or areas in their dealings with the Communist-dominated
nations" (the "Javits amendment") was grounded in a recognition of the diversionary
effect of United States export controls. 76 Stat. 127 (1962), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2022
(2) (Supp. 1966). See also Javits, The Political Stakes in East-West Trade, sub-
mitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic
Committee, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). Cf. "The Control of Exports-A Com-
parison of the Laws of the United States, Canada, Japan, and the Federal Republic
of Germany," prepared by Russell Baker and Robert M. Bohlig, Baker, McKenzie &
Hightower, Chicago; Professor Detlev Vagts, Harvard Law School; and Walter
H. Glass, Chairman, Committee on Export Control and Promotion, A.B.A. Section of
International and Comparative Law, in discharge of an assignment given the Committee
on Export Control and Promotion of the Section of International and Comparative
Law of the American Bar Association; Hay, Some Aspects of the East-West Trade in
Britain, Germany, and the Common Market (unpublished).
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and of the potentialities for expanding American exports through
"regular government-to-government negotiations."
The ultimate success of the proposed East-West Trade Relations
Act in providing a framework for expansion of American exports to
Communist countries depends, in large part, upon the extent to which
the commercial agreements to be negotiated will reduce the restrictive
effect of our present system of export controls. It is the Export
Control Act of 1949, under which the President may prohibit or
curtail any or all exports from the United States, which in the past
has been the principal obstacle to the expansion of East-West trade.23
A brief analysis of the actual operation of that act will disclose that,
although the basic structure of the controls under it would not be
affected by the proposed East-West Trade Relations Act,2 neverthe-
less, there is a considerable leeway within which the parties to a
commercial agreement-the United States and an individual Com-
munist country-could bargain for the relaxation of certain restric-
tions which are not essential to the national security.
The President has delegated his powers under the Export Control
Act to the Department of Commerce,25 which administers the act
through the Office of Export Control of the Bureau of International
Commerce.2 The Office of Export Control has created a veritable
labyrinth of regulations concerning what may be exported, to what
countries, under what conditions, and by what procedures.
2 7
All exports from the United States are subject to either a validated
license; for which application must be made (in most cases) to
the Office of Export Control,2 or a general license, that is, a general
23. 63 Stat. 7 (1949), 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 2021-32 (Supp. 1966). The act has
been extended seven times. 65 Stat. 43 (1951); 67 Stat. 62 (1953); 70 Stat. 407
(1956); 72 Stat. 220 (1958); 74 Stat. 130 (1960); 76 Stat. 122 (1962); 79 Stat.
209 (1965). It was amended in 1962 and again in 1965. The authority granted
in the act will terminate on June 30, 1969, unless renewed. See Berman & Garson,
U.S. Export Control-Past, Present and Future, to be published in a forthcoming
issue of the Columbia Law Review.
24. Sec. 10(b) of the proposed act states that "Nothing in this Act shall be
deemed to modify or amend the Export Control Act of 1949.
25. Exec. Order No. 9630, 10 Fed. Reg. 12245 (1945).
26. Commerce Dep't Order No. 182, 28 Fed. Reg. 1073-77 (1963).
27. The Export Regulations are published in the Federal Register, as issued. They
are also published in their entirety as of December 31 of each year in 15 C.F.R. § 368.
The regulations are also contained in a loose-leaf publication, entitled Comprehensive
Export Schedule, which, as amended by Current Export Bulletins, may be obtained
by subscription from the Superintendent of Documents. Under § 8 of the act, the
Department of Commerce submits quarterly reports to the Congress covering its
administration of the act. These reports are obtainable from the Superintendent of
Documents.
28. For exports which are controlled by agencies other than the Office of Export
Control, see 15 C.F.R. § 370.5 (1966). In particular, exports of arms, ammunition, and
implements of war, and technical data relating thereto, are controlled by the Office
1]967 ]
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authorization to export certain types of commodities to certain desti-
nations without the necessity of filing an application.29 Whether a
validated license is required depends upon the nature of the goods
and their intended destination.
More specifically, the Export Regulations divide the world (except
for Canada) into seven country groups-S, T, V, W, X, Y, and Z.
30
Group T includes the Western Hemisphere except for Canada and
Cuba; Group V includes all the non-Communist countries outside
the Western Hemisphere, plus Yugoslavia; Group W comprises Po-
land and Rumania; Group X encompasses Hong Kong and Macao;
Group Y is the "Soviet bloc" exclusive of Poland and Rumania (that
is, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and
the Soviet Union); Group Z includes Communist China, Communist-
controlled areas of Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba. In November
of 1966 Country Group S was created, consisting of Southern Rho-
desia.31
Exports which require validated licenses for shipment to Country
Groups T and V (the "free world") also require validated licenses
for all other destinations. On the other hand, there are a large number
of exports which require validated licenses for shipment to Com-
munist destinations but not for shipment to so-called free world
destinations; 32 and within the Communist sphere, (1) virtually no
commodities may be shipped to Group Z countries without a validated
licensem (and in fact licenses to export to Group Z countries are
of Munitions Control and the Department of State, under regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of State under the authority of § 414 of the Mutual Security Act, 68 Stat. 848
(1954), 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (1965). See 31 Fed. Reg. 15174 (1966) (International
Traffic in Arms).
29. For general licenses, see 15 C.F.R. § 371 (1966). For validated licenses,
see 15 C.F.R. § 372 (1966). Other special licenses are contained in §§ 374 (Project
License), 375 (Blanket License), 376 (Periodic Requirements License), 377 (Time
Limit License). The major restraint on general license shipments is that goods so
shipped cannot be re-exported or diverted to a country for which a validated license is
required for a direct exportation from the United States. A validated license, on the
other hand, authorizes the exportation of a particular commodity (or technical data)
to a particular consignee in a particular country for a particular use. Exports made
under validated license can rarely be re-exported or diverted without the express
authorization of the Office of Export Control. Applications for validated licenses must be
accompanied by an "order" for the goods sought to be exported as well as a statement
by the ultimate purchaser or consignee concerning the end-use of the item sought to
be exported.
30. 15 C.F.R. § 370.1(g)(2) (1966).
31. CuRRENT ExPoRT BuLL. 943, Nov. 14, 1966.
32. In 1965 the so-called Positive List of restricted exports was replaced by a
Commodity Control List. 15 C.F.R. § 399 (1966). It lists virtually every item in the
Commerce Department's census classification of goods exported from the United States,
and indicates with respect to each item whether or not a validated license is required
for export to each of the various country groups.
33. Newspapers and periodicals can be shipped to Group Z countries under gen-
eral license. In addition to controls imposed under the Export Control Act, the
[ VOL. 20
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practically never granted), (2) certain goods which require validated
licenses for export to Group Y countries can be shipped under general
license to Group W (Poland and Rumania), and (3) applications for
licenses to export to certain Group Y countries-for example, Albania
and East Germany-will be judged by the Office of Export Control
according to different standards from those applied to applications for
licenses to export to other Group Y countries such as Hungary and
Czechoslovakia.
The distinction between Country Groups W and Y was largely
extinguished by President Johnson's decision of October 7, 1966, to
remove the validated license requirement with respect to some 400
items which required such licenses for export to Group Y bi-t not to
Group W.3 Since these benefits were not extended to East Germany,
however, one principal effect of the President's decision was to create,
in effect, a new country group for licensing purposes, that is, "Group
Z and East Germany."
The President's action did not affect the authority of the Office
of Export Control to decide whether to grant or reject license appli-
cations for export of commodities which still require licenses for
shipment to Communist countries. The distinctions between different
country groups for purposes of the validated license requirement are
not in themselves a reliable guide to the probable licensing action
Foreign Assets Control Regulations and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, issued
under authority of § 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, prohibit
any "person" (including corporations) subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
whether situated in the United States or (with respect to Asian Communist countries)
abroad, from exporting anything to, or importing anything from, Communist China,
Communist-controlled areas of Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba without a Treasury
Department license or a Commerce Department license. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500 (1959), 515
(Supp. 1964).
34. Exports to friendly foreign embassies in Peking are occasionally approved, e.g.,
"a household refrigerator, valued at $150." ExPoRT CONTROL, 76TH Q. Ra'. 16 (U.S.
Office of Export Control, 2d Q. 1966).
35. N. Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1966, p. 12, col. 2; CURRENT ExponT BuLL. 941 (Oct. 12,
1966). An amusing editorial comment on the licensing changes appeared in the
Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1966, p. 14, under the title "Spy Store for the Government."
The author states that "to let enemy operatives buy our arsenic may only be quaint.
But it seems scarcely short of treason to sell them 'prepared culture medias,' those
readymade breeding grounds of germ warfare. The sugar cane knives and wood-
working punches newly made available will be lethal. And no longer will our
potential enemies (except, wisely, the wily East Germans) even be denied 'caps for
cap pistols.'
In fact, however, most of the items "freed for export" were always available
under validated license, i.e., licenses were always granted. Indeed, from an ad-
ministrative point of view, the largest benefit of the President's decision may accrue
to the Office of Export Control, which is now relieved of a measure of unnecessary
paperwork. And, as the Wall Street Journal noted, "one wonders only why the
Russians haven't been allowed all along to buy as many windmills, water softeners
and sets of woolen underwear as they wish," i.e., under general license procedures.
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of the Office of Export Control; indeed, that Office will sometimes
allow the shipment to a Communist country of goods or articles
which require validated licenses for export to the so-called free
world.
The only restraint on the authority of the Office of Export Control
to issue licenses for export to Communist destinations lies in a multi-
lateral trade control scheme under which all of the NATO nations
(excluding Iceland) and Japan have agreed to embargo the ship-
ment to all Communist countries-except Yugoslavia and Cuba-of
an internationally agreed-upon list of strategic commodities.1 This
list represents a minimum consensus of what should be considered
strategic for export control purposes. Before shipping goods appear-
ing on the list to Communist countries (other than Yugoslavia and
Cuba), the United States would have to seek an "exception" from
the other NATO countries.37 All of the listed goods are subject to
an import certification and delivery verification system (IC/DV),
under which license applications to export from one participating
country to another must be accompanied by an import certificate from
the importing country. The import certificate represents a commit-
ment by the importer to his government, under sanction of penalties,
that he will abide by its terms. In some cases, the importer must
also furnish the government of the exporting country with a delivery
verification, that is, a document furnished by the government of the
importing country certifying that the goods have in fact arrived.38
Approximately one-half of all the commodities which require vali-
36. This international embargo list or the "COCOM" list (Coordinating Committee)
is secret but is said to conform to the "Battle Act Title I List" (Categories A and
B), that is, the list of goods drawn up under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control
Act of 1951 (the "Battle Act"), under which act all United States economic or fi-
nancial assistance must be cut off to any nation which does not apply "an embargo"
on the shipment of any goods on this list to "any nation or combination of nations
threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and all countries under its domination." 65 Stat. 645 (1951), as amended,
22 U.S.C. § 1611 (1965). Changes in the COCOM embargo list are reflected in
changes in the Battle Act Title I List. The major difference between the two lists
is that the international agreement does not extend to exports to Cuba. The "Ad-
ministrator" of the Battle Act (the body responsible for drawing up these different
lists and representing the United States in the Coordinating Committee forum) is
lodged within the Office of East-West Trade of the Department of State.
37. An "exception procedure" is necessary to and an important part of the inter-
national embargo system, and it has been availed of by most of the member countries
of COCOM. Cf. Dep't of State, The Battle Act Report 1966, 19th Rep. to Congress
68-71.
38. The Transaction Control Regulations, issued under authority of § 5(b) of the
Trading with the Enemy 'Act of 1917, prohibit foreign-based subsidiaries of United
States firms from exporting IC/DV items, as well as commodities on the United States
Munitions List, to any Communist country except Yugoslavia and Cuba. 31 C.F.R.
§ 505 (1959). Some NATO nations have imposed similar controls on their own
nationals.
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dated licenses for export to Country Groups T and V (the "free
world") are subject to the IC/DV requirement and are therefore
contained on the international embargo list. Except for such com-
modities-approximately 600, or, based on the five-digit Standard
International Trade Classification, about 120-the Office of Export
Control has complete discretion in granting or refusing license appli-
cations to export to particular countries.
In addition to restricting the exportation of goods, the Office of
Export Control also restricts the exportation of technical data, defined
in the Export Regulations as "any professional, scientific or technical
information, including any model, design, photograph, photographic
file, document or other article or material, containing a plan, speci-
fication, or descriptive or technical information of any kind which
can be used or adapted for use in connection with any process,
synthesis, or operation in the production, manufacture, utilization or
reconstruction of article or materials."39 The Office of Export Control
has construed technical data to include information contained in the
mind, and not manifested in any written or other tangible form,
that is, "know-how and experience"; and it has construed an exporta-
tion of technical data to include release or application of such "know-
how and experience" by American persons while abroad.
40
The Office of Export Control has established a series of three gen-
eral licenses which permit exports of certain technical data. In
substance, they allow published data to go to all destinations, and
unpublished data to go to all non-Communist destinations and Yugo-
slavia, without a validated license.41 Exports of unpublished data
to Communist countries (except Yugoslavia) require validated li-
censes, except for certain types of unpublished scientific and educa-
cational data which may be exported under general license.42 Exports
of unpublished data to non-Communist destinations are subject to
the requirement of written assurance from the foreign consignee or
licensee (in the form of a letter or as part of a licensing agreement)
that neither the technical data nor the direct product thereof will
be re-exported or provided to Communist countries.43
Technical data exportations that do not fall within the provisions
of a general license can be made only under a validated- license:
The general license provisions are such that most validated license
applications will involve exports of unpublished technical data to
39. 15 C.F.R. § 385.1(a) (1966).
40. Hydrocarbon Research Inc., 27 Fed. Reg. 12487 (1962).
41. 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(b) (1966) (Published Technical Data-General Licenses
GTDP); § 385.2(c) (Unpublished Technical Data-General License GTDU); § 385.
2(d) (Scientific and Educational Data-General License GTDS).
42. For validated license procedure, see 15 C.F.R. § 385.4 (1966).
43. 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(c)(4), (5) (1966).
1967 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Communist countries. Exports of unpublished data to friendly foreign
countries will require validated licenses, however, whenever foreign
buyers refuse to comply with the written assurance requirements. 44
The Office of Export Control will then consider whether the proposed
export, absent written assurances, would be inimical to the national
security.
Principally as a result of controls imposed on exports of commodities
and technical data by the Department of Commerce, annual United
States exports to Communist countries have hovered close to the low
figures of the Korean War.45 On the one hand, relatively few com-
modities can be shipped to Communist countries under general license,
and most of those which can are not items they wish to buy. On
the other hand, the American business community has become re-
signed to the stringent licensing standards of the Office of Export
Control and, for the most part, no longer bothers to submit license
applications for exports other than those sufficiently innocuous to
meet with routine approval.46 A validated license application must
be accompanied by a "firm order" for the commodity sought to
be exported, and the Office of Export Control will not give advance
opinions as to the propriety of a proposed shipment.47 Many business-
men, however, are not prepared to risk the time and money required
to negotiate binding contracts without some assurance that their con-
tracts will not be frustrated by a "no go" decision on the part of the
Office of Export Control.
A Communist government interested in entering into a commercial
agreement with the United States will inevitably desire to import
particular goods from the United States, that is, it will want its
import agencies to be able to approach American businessmen and
seek contracts for the sale of particular commodities and technical
data. It will want to know, therefore, whether the validated license
requirement can be replaced by a general license, and, if not, whether
assurances can be obtained that the Office of Export Control will
approve particular license applications.
The mechanics of both alternatives were clearly illustrated by
the changes in export licensing which resulted from intergovernmental
44. 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(c)(4) (1966).
45. In calendar year 1965, United States exports to all Communist countries (ex-
cluding Yugoslavia) amounted to $139 million, out of total exports of $26.5 billion.
ExPoRT COTRmOL, 75TH Q. RF-s. 42 (U.S. Office of Export Control, 1st Q. 1966).
46. In calendar year 1965, the Office of Export Control approved over 95% of
applications to export to Communist countries, ExPoRT CONTROL, 74TH Q. REP. 5
(U.S. Office of Export Control, 4th Q. 1965).
47. The firm order requirement will be relaxed in unusual circumstances, e.g.,
where an unusual expenditure of time, money, or technical skill, in excess of ordinary
sales expenses, is necessary before a bid can be submitted and an order obtained.
15 C.F.R. § 372.4(f)(3) (1966).
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negotiations with Rumania in 1964.4 By transferring Rumania from
Country Group Y to Country Group W, that is, by extending to
Rumania the same treatment accorded to Poland, the Office of Ex-
port Control in effect removed the validated license requirement for
approximately 500 commodities. This is particularly significant in
the light of Rumania's interest in complete plants and factories,
necessitating the export of many hundreds of commodities and tech-
nical data.
In addition,' the Rumanian trade delegation which negotiated the
agreement, headed by the Chairman of the Rumanian State Planning
Commission and the Minister of Foreign Trade, brought with it a
"shopping list" of some fifteen categories of items, of which approxi-
mately ten categories were accepted by the United States Government
as appropriate. After the Joint Communiqu6 was signed and the trade
delegation departed, a Rumanian purchasing committee stayed in the
United States to negotiate contracts with American firms and to obtain
assurances of credits from the Export-Import Bank. The United States
Government did not, of course, enter into the negotiation of contracts;
it could, however, and did, give tentative assurances that export
licenses would be granted for the agreed-upon categories of goods,
and it gave the Rumanian delegation the names of American producers
of such goods, with a "to whom it may concern" letter indicating the
inter-governmental context in which approaches by Rumanian pur-
chasers to American exporters were being made.
From the viewpoint of the Office of Export Control, such advance
assurance that licenses will probably be granted for the export of
particular types of goods has much more to commend it than a
change in licensing requirements, i.e., a shift of the desired com-
modities from validated to general license, since such a change in
licensing requirements would redound to the benefit of all the
countries in the same Country Group, including those with which
commercial agreements have not been negotiated. From the viewpoint
of the affected Communist country, such advance assurance is also
highly desirable, since it serves as a channel for negotiating the
purchase of products whose export the United States Government
might not be willing to place under general license. Indeed, as we
have seen, present licensing requirements for exports to Country
Group W (Poland and Rumania) are not substantially more lenient
than licensing requirements for exports to Country Group Y, so that
Hungary or Czechoslovakia, for example, would not have very much
to gain from a reclassification.




The Johnson Act.-One of the more severe American restrictions
upon trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is the Johnson
Act of 1934, as amended, which makes it a crime for any individual,
partnership, or private corporation or association to extend any loan
to, or purchase or sell securities of, a foreign government which is in
default in the payment of its obligations to the United States.49
The act specifically exempts public corporations created pursuant to
special congressional legislation, such as the Commodity Credit Corpo-
ration, as well as corporations in which the Government of the
United States exercises a controlling interest. Special legislation was
enacted to exempt the Export-Import Bank from the Johnson Act.50
The Johnson Act was amended in 1945 to exclude from the pro-
hibitions contained therein countries which are members of the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the "World
Bank") and the International Monetary Fund.51 The practical effect
of the amendment was to restrict the application of the Johnson
Act to Communist countries-except Yugoslavia, which is a member
both of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The
Soviet Union and all east European countries, with the exception of
Bulgaria, are considered to be in default in the payment of their
obligations to the United States within the meaning of the Johnson
Act8
2
The Johnson Act, by its terms, prohibits merely the making of
"loans" to certain foreign governments. Shortly after it became law
in 1934, Attorney General Cummings confirmed that it was not the
purpose of Congress to discontinue all commercial relations with the
defaulting countries, and stated that the act did not relate to obliga-
tions issued in the ordinary course of business such as drafts, checks,
and other ordinary aids to banking and commercial transactions
"which are 'obligations' in a broad sense but not in the sense in-
tended." 3 Nevertheless, given the tensions of the "cold war" and
the natural conservatism of the banking community, there developed
the view, both within and without the Government, that deferred
payment arrangements for exports to countries subject to the John-
son Act, with or without bank financing, might be encompassed by
the term "loan" as it appears in the act. Although short-term obli-
49. 48 Stat. 574 (1934), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 955 (1965).
50. 59 Stat. 529 (1945), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 635(2) (1965).
51. 18 U.S.C. 955(b) (1965).
52. In response to inquiries concerning foreign governments to which loans may not
be extended under the Johnson Act, the State Department sends a letter citing Treasury
Department rulings to the effect that all the countries of Eastern Europe except Bulgaria
are in default in their payments to the United States.
53. 38 Ops. A7ry GEN. 505 (1934).
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gations (up to 180 days) clearly fell within the term "ordinary aids
to banking and commercial transactions," the term "loan" was con-
sidered to apply to credits beyond six months. Use of the six-month
dividing line was suggested in an informal opinion of the Attorney
Generars Office, in response to inquiries by American businessmen.
The point was never tested in court.
The Attorney General's interpretation of the term "loan," as it
appears in the Johnson Act, underwent sudden re-examination in
1963 when the opportunity arose to sell large quantities of surplus
United States wheat to the Soviet Union.M The Secretary of State
asked the Attorney General for a formal opinion on the propriety
of sales by private American firms to the Soviet Union on a deferred-
payment basis.55 Attorney General Kennedy replied that the right
to defer payment for goods sold is a credit and not a loan:
[Njeither sales transactions by American exporters on a deferred-payment
basis, nor payments made to such exporters by third parties in return for
an assignment of the right to payment in connection with such sales, are
'loans' to the purchaser of the exported goods in the ordinary sense of
that term in legal and commercial usage.5 6
The Attorney General stated, however, that "extensions of credit
for an inordinately long period" could not be used "as a device to
circumvent the prohibition against loans" and that certain types of
transactions "would violate the Act, regardless of their purely formal
characteristics, if used as a subterfuge to evade it." Nevertheless, he
ruled that the Johnson Act does not prohibit extensions of credit
"within the range of those commonly encountered in commercial
sales of a comparable character."
The State Department has subsequently taken the view that "de-
ferred payment arrangements for exports from the United States to
countries subject to the Johnson Act, with or without bank financing,
are permitted, so long as the credit terms are comparable to those
commonly given for export of the same commodities to other coun-
tries. 57 Neither the State Department nor the Office of the Attorney
General has given any support for the widely held view that the
54. See Communication From the President of the United States Transmitting a
Report to the Congress Giving the Reasons for This Government's Decision Not to
Prohibit the Sale of Surplus American Wheat, Wheat Flour, Feed Grains, and Other
Agricultural Commodities for Shipment to the Soviet Union and Other Eastern. European
Countries During the Next Several Months, H.R. Doc. No. 163, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963).
55. Credit was never requested by the Soviet Union nor granted by .the companies
making the sales. The particular conditions of the sale had not, however, been
resolved at the time of the formal request, and it was anticipated that the Soviet
Union might seek some kind of credit arrangement.
56. 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 661 (1963).
57. Dep't of State, The Battle Act Report 1965, 18th Rep. to Congress 44.
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Attorney General's letter replaced the six-month rule with a five-
year rule.5 Instead, the Office of the Attorney General together
with the State Department has replaced an unofficial fixed standard
with a fairly elastic one. It is unlikely, however, that any business-
man or any bank will want to test the boundaries of the act without
a more definitive statement by the Attorney General.
As in the case of export controls, the proposed East-West Trade
Relations Act does not expressly affect credit restrictions under the
Johnson Act. It does, however, state that one purpose of the com-
mercial agreements to be negotiated under it is "the settlement of
financial and property claims." Presumably, such a settlement would
result in a finding by the United States that the partner to the agree-
ment is no longer in default of its obligations for purposes of the
Johnson Act.
Credit Controls Under Public Law 480.-The Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, commonly referred to as
Public Law 480, as amended, prohibits sales of agricultural commod-
ities on credit terms to "any country or area dominated or controlled
by a foreign government or organization controlling the world
Communist movement." Yugoslavia has never been included in this
definition, and in 1956 Poland also was determined to have the
necessary degree of independence to be excluded, although in the
case of Poland payment terms for credit sales cannot exceed five
years (as contrasted with the maximum payment period of 20 years
applicable to "friendly" countries), s9 Although credit restrictions
under Public Law 480 would not be directly affected by the East-West
Trade Relations Act, commercial agreements negotiated under the
Act could conceivably lead to a situation in which various Eastern
European countries (in particular, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
and possibly eventually Bulgaria) could, like Poland and Yugoslavia,
be considered as no longer "dominated or controlled by a foreign
government or organization controlling the world Communist move-
ment." This might leave the Soviet Union in the peculiar situation of
controlling a "world Communist movement" located chiefly in those
parts of the world "dominated or controlled by Communist China." 60
58. Cf. Haight, U.S. Regulation of East-West Trade, 19 Bus. LAw. 875 (1964).
59. 7 U.S.C. § 1691 (1965). The act as amended in 1964 also prohibits the United
States from making sales of agricultural commodities for local foreign currencies to
"any country or area dominated by a Communist goverment"-that is, including
Yugoslavia and Poland. Public Law 88-638, § 11. With respect to pre-1964 local
currency sales to Poland, see note 16 supra and Dep't of State, The Battle Act Report
1965, 18th Rep. to Congress 41.
60. Under Public Law 480, barter transactions can be made with all Communist
countries except the Soviet Union or any country dominated or controlled by Communist
China.
In addition, the Food for Peace Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 1527, amended Public Law
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The Export-Import Bank.-The Export-Import Bank of Washington,
owned by the United States Government, is expressly exempted from
the operation of the Johnson Act. Also the Attorney General has stated
that the Johnson Act would not apply to private insurance companies,
acting through the Foreign Credit Insurance Association (FCIA),
which might participate with the Bank in the issuance of credit guar-
antees. 61 However, Title III of the 1964 Foreign Aid and Related
Appropriations Act provided that:
None of the funds made available because of the provisions of this Title
shall be used by the Export-Import Bank to either guarantee the payment
of any obligation hereafter incurred by any Communist country . . . or in
any other way to participate in the extension of credit to any such coun-
try . . . except when the President determines that such guarantees would
be in the national interest and reports each such determination to the
House of Representatives and the Senate .... 62
Since 1964 the President has signed successive determinations
which, taken together, permit the Export-Import Bank to issue me-
dium-term export guarantees (180 days to five years) in connec-
tion with the sale of all United States products to Poland, Hungary,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania;6 3 to issue long-term guaran-
tees (in excess of five years) in connection with the sale of all
United States products to Yugoslavia;6 and to issue medium-term
480 by prohibiting the President from making foreign currency sales or credit sales
to "any nation which sells or furnishes or permits ships or aircraft under its registry to
transport to or from Cuba or North Vietnam . . . any equipment, materials, or com-
modities so long as they are governed by a Communist regime: Provided, That with
respect to furnishing, selling, or selling and transporting to Cuba medical supplies, non-
strategic raw materials for agriculture, and non-strategic agricultural or food com-
modities, sales agreements may be entered into if the President finds . . . that the
making of such agreement would be in the national interest of the United States .. "
On December 30, 1966, the Administration suspended the sale of surplus foods to
Yugoslavia because various Yugoslav groups donated medical supplies and blood plasma
to North Vietnam. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1966, p. 1, col. 5.
61. 59 Stat. 526 (1945), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1965).
62. 77 Stat. 863 (1964). The Senate bill was proposed soon after the President's
statement on October 9, 1963, that he had authorized the issuance of export licenses
for the sale of wheat to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. See note 54
supra. The bill was opposed by the State Department. 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 935
(1963).
63. On February 4, 1964, President Johnson informed the Congress that he bad
determined that it is in the national interest for the Export-Import Bank to issue
guarantees in connection with the sale of United States agricultural products to these
five countries and to the U.S.S.R. On June 15, 1964, the President extended the
Bank's authority to issue guarantees in connection with the sale of all United States
products and services to Rumania. On October 7, 1966, the President extended
similar authority for sales to Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, but not
to the U.S.S.R.
64. On February 4, 1964, the President determined that it would be in the national
interest for the Export-Import Bank to issue. guarantees in connection with the sale
of United States products and services to Yugoslavia. On May 21, 1964, he approved
guarantees of long-term loans to finance exports to Yugoslavia.
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guarantees in connection with the sale of United States agricultural
products to the Soviet Union.65
The President's authority to allow the Export-Import Bank to ex-
tend commercial credits to Communist countries may be restricted
by the prohibition contained in the Mutual Defense Assistance Con-
trol Act of 1951 (popularly known as the Battle Act) against the
granting of United States economic or financial assistance to any
nation which knowingly permits the shipment of arms, ammunition,
implements of war, or certain other strategic materials "to any nation
or combination of nations threatening the security of the United
States including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all
countries under its domination." 66 The State Department has taken
the view that since the U.S.S.R. "does knowingly permit such ship-
ments to other Communist countries in the Sino-Soviet bloc, and
vice versa . . . the United States therefore may not engage in any
transaction with the U.S.S.R. or other Communist bloc countries which
constitutes military, economic, or financial assistance."67
The Acting General Counsel of the International Cooperation Ad-
ministration has stated that extension by the Commodity Credit Corpo-
ration of credit for a period not exceeding three years in connec-
tion with the export of agricultural commodities from its stock would
not constitute "financial assistance," and that the Battle Act was
not intended to apply to transactions purely of a commercial charac-
ter initiated and carried out primarily for the benefit of the United
States Government.68 Similarly, medium-term commercial credits by
the Export-Import Bank would not be considered "assistance" for
the purposes of the Battle Act. However, "inordinately long" guaran-
tees by the Export-Import Bank, that is, credit terms in excess of
those encountered in other commercial export transactions, might
be construed as "assistance" under the terms of the Battle Act.69
65. See note 63 supra.
66. Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, supra note 36.
67. Dep't of State, The Battle Act Report 1965, 18th Rep. to Congress 40. This
view does not seem to be entirely shared by the Attorney General's Office. In his
letter to the Department of State concerning the application of certain statutes to
wheat sales to the Soviet Union and East European countries, Attorney General
Kennedy stated that "the Battle Act did not purport to regulate private U.S. ship-
ments to Soviet bloc countries, which were already subject to regulation under the
Export Control Act. The Battle Act relates, rather, to trade with the Soviet bloc by
countries receiving aid or assistance from the United States." See note 56 supra.
68. Letter of March 14, 1957, to Department of Agriculture from Peter K. Morse,
Acting General Counsel, International Cooperation Administration, concerning the
Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, in Background Documents on East-
West Trade, SEN. Comvr. ON FOREIGN REL., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1965).
69. We reached this conclusion with the help of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Fellow of
the, :nstitute of Politiqs, Harvard University, formerly Deputy Legal Adviser to the
Department of State.
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Intergovernmental negotiations under the proposed East-West
Trade Relations Act would provide the United States Government
with an opportunity to bargain with respect to the range of com-
mercial credits which can be offered by the Export-Import Bank.
Although the text of the Joint Communiqu6 describing the agree-
ments reached by Rumania and the United States in 1964 does not
refer to export credits, two weeks after the negotiations were con-
cluded President Johnson authorized the Export-Import Bank to
extend commercial credits in connection with the sale of all United
States products to Rumania.70 Since the Bank's authority to extend
credits to the Soviet Union is restricted to the sale of United States
agricultural products, one incident of a commercial agreement be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union could be an authori-
zation to the Bank to extend commercial credits for sales of United
States industrial products as well. In addition, since virtually all of
the major Western countries have granted export credits in excess
of five years to. Communist countries,' it is possible that the Adminis-
tration may wish to reconsider the propriety of the five-year credit
line in connection with commercial agreements reached with par-
ticular Communist countries.72
CONCLUSION
It should be stressed again that the proposed East-West Trade
Relations Act does not expressly purport to alter the structure of
American export and credit controls. Instead, it speaks only in
terms of bargaining with respect to most-favored-nation treatment,
that is, the removal of discriminatory restrictions upon imports in
return for a variety of concessions which would considerably ease
the position of American firms doing business with Communist state
trading agencies. If intergovernmental commercial agreements can
be negotiated for the realization of these objectives, a long step
forward will have been taken toward normalizing trade relations
between the United States and the "less unfriendly"-if we may sug-
gest a phrase that might have appeal for some Congressmen-Coin-
70. See note 63 supra.
71. Cf. Clesner, supra note 9, at 184.
72. In 1958, the United States managed to -persuade most of its allies to limit
commercial credits to Communist countries to five years. This informal agreement
was achieved in the Berne Union (Union D'Assureurs des Credits Internationaux),
an international association of government-owned or supported export credit in-
surers. The so-called five-year credit line was maintained by most of the members
until 1964. In that year, England and most of the Common Market countries ex-
tended credits in excess of five years for various projects in different Communist
countries. In 1965 the Export-Import Bank- granted what was in effect a 7Y2 year
credit (30 months deferred and 6% interest for the next 5 years) for construction of a
petroleum cracking plant in Rumania.
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munist countries. Not only the affected Communist countries but
also the United States would benefit economically both by the with-
drawal of special American tariff barriers-which would enable Ameri-
can importers and consumers to obtain products of Communist
countries on favorable terms-and by the reduction of existing Com-
munist barriers to American traders. In fact, we are probably hurting
ourselves much more than anyone else by levying a 35 per cent higher
duty upon Soviet vodka than upon liquor from Western Europe,
a 400 per cent higher duty on Soviet manganese than on manganese
from South America, Asia, and Africa, and a 50 per cent higher duty
on Soviet watches than on Swiss watches.
The proposed act has additional implications, not apparent on its
face. "Regular government-to-government negotiations," leading to
intergovernmental commercial agreements, may well result in a modi-
fication of American export and credit controls in return for a variety
of commitments, possibly including the commitment to purchase par-
ticular American products. If past experience is any guide, the Office
of Export Control can be fully trusted not to permit any shipments
which would be inimical to the national security. In the past, the
United States has been wary of entering into intergovernmental com-
mercial agreements of the kind indicated, although our agreements
with Poland and Rumania contain some of their features. When
Soviet Premier Khrushchev, in June 1958, proposed a comprehensive
Soviet-American trade agreement, listing many types of peaceful goods
which the Soviet Union would like either to purchase or offer for
sale in the United States, President Eisenhower rejected the bid.73
"As you know," the President wrote:
United States export and import trade is carried on by individual firms
and not under governmental auspices. There is no need, therefore, to
formalize relations between United States firms and Soviet trade organi-
zations. Soviet trade organizations are free right now, without any need
for special action by the United States Government, to develop a larger
volume of trade with firms in this country. .... 74
Less than a year later, in May 1959, the Soviet Union negotiated
a five-year trade agreement with the United Kingdom very similar
to that proposed to President Eisenhower. In fact, if we study the
73. For a detailed discussion of the Khrushchev proposal and the response of
President Eisenhower and the State Department, see Berman, supra note 5, at 525-
27. See also Berman, The Relationship Between U.S.S.R.-U.S. Trade and the Further
Growth of an International Climate Favorable to Peace, in THE LAw OF U.S.-U.S.S.R.
TRADE 3, 14-16 (1965) (papers prepared for Conference of American and Soviet
Legal Scholars, Ass'n of Am. Law Schools). The Soviet offer of a trade agreement
was renewed informally in 1964 by Khrushchev's successor as Chairman of the Coun-
cil of Ministers, A.. N. Kosygin.
74. 39 D-,'T STATE BuLL. 200 (1958).
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way in which England, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Sweden,
Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, and a host of other non-Communist coun-
tries conduct trade with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and the other Communist countries, we find that such trade is gen-
erally carried out on the basis of bilateral trade agreements contain-
ing programs for the exchange of particular goods in particular quanti-
ties over a period of years.
There is nothing sinister in such programmed trade agreements, if
they are properly negotiated and implemented. From the viewpoint
of a planned economy, the lists of goods ("contingents") contained
in the agreements can help form the basis for plans concerning do-
mestic production and consumption. From the viewpoint of Western
countries, the negotiating of the contingents is a means of preventing,
even in advance of applications for licenses, exports which have
strategic value or which for any other reason are undesirable. The
Western government agrees only that it will issue export licenses
to its private exporters, upon their application, for the listed quantities
of the listed goods. No governmental commitment is made that sales
will actually be made, and no system of import licensing is required
on the Western side. The agreed-upon contingents of exports and
imports are merely targets. Yet through the governmental negotiation
of these targets it is possible to exert pressure for expanding trade in
particular directions. In such an agreement with the Soviet Union,
for example, it could be stipulated that a certain proportion of Soviet
imports from the United States should consist of consumer goods
and agricultural products. Thus not only the individual interests of
particular American business firms, but also the national economic
interests of the United States, could be protected.
Whether or not the commercial agreements to be negotiated by
the United States under the proposed East-West Trade Relations Act
take the prevalent form of intergovernmental trade agreements be-
tween Communist and other non-Communist countries, they would
surely help to overcome the widespread American myth that our
exports to Communist countries constitute a kind of foreign aid pro-
gram. If we were to repeat Great Britain's experience with the Soviet
Union, we would find that the Communist countries are not in a
position to take as many of our exports as we would like them to
take and that they are fully aware that a sale is not a gift, that im-
ports must eventually be paid out of the proceeds of exports, and
that trade in general is a matter of mutual advantage and not a
"zero-sum game" in which one side's gain is another side's loss.
Above all, commercial agreements with Communist countries-
negotiated on the basis of mutual advantage-can help to prove to
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them that their own long-range interests are linked with the stability
and integrity of the international economic order. If we may take
the liberty of quoting what one of us has written elsewhere,
In the 1920's and 1930's one of the principal charges levied against the
Soviet leaders was that they had withdrawn from the world economy, that
their foreign trade system was inherently restrictive and discriminatory,
and that their goal was self-sufficiency. In the 1950's and 1960's the
Soviet leaders have come out of their shell, have abandoned their earlier
tendency toward economic isolationism, and have sought to establish firmer
economic ties with the West. It is strange indeed that they should now
be able to charge the United States with subverting economics to politics,
with refusal to trade, and with discriminatory trade practices.7
5
This argument applies, of course, with added force to the other
Communist countries of Europe, which are, in fact, Western coun-
tries, and which are openly striving to lessen their economic de-
pendence upon the Soviet Union and upon each other26 The Com-
munist countries can no longer afford to view trade as a political
weapon for isolating themselves from the "capitalist camp," and by
the same token we can no longer afford to view trade as a political
weapon for containing Communism. The proposed East-West Trade
Relations Act may be a belated recognition of these historic facts.
At least it provides an opportunity to create legal institutions that
reflect their significance.
75. Berman, A Reappraisal of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Policy, 42 Harv. Bus. Rev. No. 4,
139, 151 (1964).
76. Cf. Berman, We Can Trade With the Cominmunists, 202 The Nation, No. 26, 766
(June 27, 1966).
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